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Everyone knows that historians and legal scholars do history differently.
Laura Kalman, a contributor to this Symposium, has put it nicely. Historians
favor "context, change, and explanation"; legal scholars value "text,
continuity and prescription." ' The historians' role is to scold the law
scholars for doing law-office history, for "getting it wrong," ironing out
context and discontinuity to muster the past into present service. This
Symposium, however, is a conversation between historians and a lawyer-
doing-history that does not follow this familiar script. The lawyer still aims
for prescription, but like the historians, his focus is change. Indeed, Bruce
Ackerman aims to prescribe new rules and standards to govern big changes
in the Constitution, and he claims to do so via history, by examining how
big changes actually have unfolded and by teasing out their immanent
patterns, rules, and grammar.2 Ackerman also is a champion of context.
"We must," he repeatedly declares, "learn to see the Founders as they saw
themselves." 3 So, more than usual, the parties to this interdisciplinary
conversation about the Founding, Reconstruction and New Deal eras in
American constitutional history are writing on the same page.
Not only are they life-long students of the periods Ackerman has
dubbed "constitutional moments," but several of the distinguished
historians and students of American political development gathered here
resemble Ackerman in another way. Their work is attuned to the ways that
the available narratives about the constitutional past have shaped the
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1. LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 10 (1996).
2. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
3. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN: WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 165 (1991).
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meanings Americans have been able to give their present and future.4 These
commonalities do not erase the great differences between the lawyer and the
historians; instead, they mean that the conversation and the differences
unfold on a deeper plane. There are fascinating interpretive disagreements,
as well as theoretical differences that range from the politics and morality of
history to underlying conceptions of historical process. The conceptual and
theoretical disagreements are often implicit, and this Introduction flags
them. It also briefly sketches a rival narrative of constitutional moments that
takes account of the historians' criticisms.
Bruce Ackerman has put the problem of change on the agenda of
constitutional scholarship. How do we describe and justify large-scale, non-
incremental changes in the United States Constitution? In We the People:
Foundations, Ackerman indicted lawyers' "professional narrative" about
these changes on two main counts. Their storyline is wildly untrue; and it
falsely belittles the "constitutional creativity and achievements of ordinary
citizens, continuing into the 20th century."' The professional narrative,
Ackerman observed, accounts for big changes either by shoehorning them
into the procedures outlined in Article V of the Constitution, or by
contending that big changes are really only "restorations" of the old order.
Thus, first this narrative slights the fact that the Founding broke with
legality by flouting the rules of amendment prescribed in the Articles of
Confederation. Next, the professional narrative simply papers over and
ignores the gulf between Article V procedures and the actual manner in
which the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were enacted. Finally, it
4. For Joyce Appleby, this has provoked theoretical reflections on how historical narratives
have figured historically in the ways people have thought and fought about ideas like liberty,
equality, and citizenship, while for Laura Kalman it has inspired a lively intellectual history of the
"historical turn" among liberal-minded constitutional scholars during the Rehnquist-era. See
JOYCE APPLEBY ET AL., TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT HISTORY (1994); KALMAN, supra note 1.
The same insight informs Sanford Levinson's work on the plurality of constitutional texts and
meanings. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988); J.M. Balkin & Sanford
Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1998).
Eric Foner and Rogers Smith have produced new and heterodox grand narratives, aiming, like
Ackerman's, to challenge and deepen our constitutional/historical self-understandings. Like We the
People, their narratives attend to "real-world processes," 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 112,
involving social movements, political parties, lawmakers and Presidents as well as courts in
conflicts over national identity, citizenship rights, and the powers and duties of government. See
ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (1988); ERIC
FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (1998); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS:
CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997). In the same vein is WILLIAM E.
FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991).
In several celebrated books and essays, Walter Dean Burnham has produced an enormously
important account about the role of party-formation and "critical elections" in American political
development; his influence on Ackerman's work is plain. See THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS:
STAGES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (William Nesbet Chambers & Walter Dean Burnham eds.,
2d ed. 1967); WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF
AMERICAN POLITICS (1970).
5. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 42-44.
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insists that the vast changes in federal-state relations heralded by the New
Deal Constitution marked no rupture with the past, but either a restoration of
John Marshall's Constitution or a faithful judicial translation thereof.
Perhaps, as Sanford Levinson suggests, no one but professional lawyers
and legal academics could take this "absurdly naive" narrative seriously.6
Only they have a professional investment in the idea that great ruptures
between one constitutional regime and the next can be recounted in a
storyline that builds a legally legitimate bridge between them.7 For political
scientists and historians, it comes as no shock that moments of great
constitutional change overflowed legal processes of legitimation Indeed,
many lawyers will concur and conclude with Stephen Griffin, that in each of
Ackerman's "moments," the key actors found the law inadequate to the
crisis at hand. They did not resort to naked force to move the nation from
one constitutional regime to the next. Rather, they found compelling moral
and political grounds beyond law, appealed for support, and prevailed.9
Ackerman is a traditional legalist in finding such "beyond law" talk
shallow and dangerous. However, he is a legalist prepared to confront the
genuinely problematic legality of the Reconstruction and New Deal
transformations. In We the People: Foundations, Ackerman claimed the
discovery of an elaborate and evolving pattern of higher lawmaking norms,
a common law of higher lawmaking, that has governed constitutional
transformations outside Article V-but not beyond law. With this discovery
he claimed to redeem not only the view that our great constitutional
transformations were lawful ones, but also the "possibility of popular
sovereignty" as the real engine of constitutional change, and the "possibility
of interpretation" as a properly backward-looking, conservative enterprise
wherein the judiciary "preserves" the higher law wrought by "We the
People" in our rare moments of constitutional awakening against the
incursions of" ordinary politics." 10
We the People: Transfonnations aims to provide the historical evidence
to support this claim. Judicial interpretation and rules of recognition for
constitutional courts to apply are not the subject of this volume; rather it is
"how American institutions have in fact operated to organize popular debate
and decision during our most creative periods of constitutional politics."'"
6. See Sanford Levinson, Transitions, 108 YALE L.J. 2215,2223 (1999).
7. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-
Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1223 (1995) (defending the
received professional narrative against Ackerman and others).
8. See Levinson, supra note 6, at 109; Jack N. Rakove, The Super-Legality of the Constitution,
or, a Federalist Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Neo-Federalism, 108 YALE L.J. 1931, 1937 (1999).
9. Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 YALE L.J. 2115, 2148-51
(1999).
10. 1 AcKERMAN, supra note 3, at 131-62.
11. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 6.
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This helps make the second volume a more congenial one for historians. It
offers rich, insightful accounts of these moments of high politics, when not
only fundamental constitutional values and doctrines were contested, but
basic institutional arrangements (the boundaries between state and civil
society, government and market, federal and state authority) and basic
questions of national identity (who belongs to "We the People," and what
rights and duties attach to membership in the national community) were up
for grabs. During such constitutive moments, social movements, ordinary
voters, reformers as well as politicians, parties, lawmakers and Presidents all
occupy the constitutional-political stage. Ackerman insists he has taken the
measure of these complex and seemingly unruly processes of change and
cashed out a set of formal rules and principles-a grammar of legitimation,
more in the manner of structuralist anthropology than legal theory-that has
enabled successful "revolutionary reformers" 12 to earn the authority to
speak for "the People" during these moments and to translate their
constitutional-political visions into law. His may be the most elaborate and
ambitious process-based constitutional theory.
Thus, Ackerman portrays the Federalists acting extralegally, using
inherited institutions, like the convention, in new ways, to earn such
authority. He distinguishes five stages of this process of higher lawmaking:
"signalling," "proposing," "triggering," "ratifying," and
"consolidating," 13 and argues that this constitutional-political process, not
compliance with prescribed rules for amendment, accounts for the
legitimacy of the constitutional change brought about by the Founding. He
then applies the precedent of the Founding to Reconstruction,14 first
highlighting how the "Republicans played fast and loose with the
Federalists' text [Article V]," then suggesting why they nevertheless may
have "remained faithful to the precedent established by the Founding
practice."15 The "stages" supplied the precedent. Reconstruction, however,
witnessed a nationalizing shift away from the Founders' balance of state and
federal higher lawmaking arenas, and toward reliance on: (a) first
presidential and later congressional leadership; (b) the dynamics of
interbranch conflict set in play by the separation of powers; and finally (c)
popular mandates secured through national elections.16
The stages exfoliate. "Ratification" has four phases of its own, which
reflect the intricate interbranch clashes over Reconstruction policy. Lincoln
and then Johnson put extraordinary pressures on the South to ratify the
Thirteenth Amendment, but with the Fourteenth Amendment, Johnson
12. 2 id. at 13.
13. See, e.g., 2 id. at 32-68 (applying the five-stage model to the Founding).
14. See 2 id. at 99-252.
15. 2 id. at 100.
16. See2id. at 236-51.
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stopped in his tracks. This prompted the Republicans on Capitol Hill to
transform the regular election of 1866 into "one of the great higher
lawmaking events of American history," going to the people with the
Fourteenth Amendment as their platform and winning a mandate for
constitutional reform. Johnson, however, denied the mandate and led ten
Southern state governments to exercise the veto seemingly offered by
Article V. The Republican Congress responded, in turn, by destroying those
governments and demanding ratification in exchange for recognizing
reconstructed governments in the South. When Johnson sought to stymie
this plan, Congress impeached him. When Johnson backed down, he
accepted the Republicans' claim to speak for the "People" in their new-
found constitutional vision, and thereby set the precedent for that later
"switch in time" on the part of the Supreme Court in 1937. Generalizing the
pattern, Ackerman sums up the process "in terms of a simple schema:
"Constitutional Impasse... Electoral 'Mandate' ... Challenge to
Dissenting Institutions ... the 'Switch in Time."" 
7
It is not hard to see how this "ratifying" schema applies to New Deal
history. Roosevelt's first term culminated in a constitutional impasse
between the branches similar to that of 1866. Once again, the separation of
powers and interbranch conflict created the arena for constitutional debate,
enabling the conservative branch to raise basic questions of legitimacy and
to challenge the reformers to go to the People if they hoped for ultimate
success. Then, when the New Dealers won crushing victories in the
presidential and congressional elections of 1936, they claimed a mandate
from the People in support of their constitutional vision.
Reconstruction and New Deal political history are not uncharted
terrains. Yet Ackerman's distinct angle of vision, his single-minded focus
on the processes of conflict, rather than on the substantive disputes about
Reconstruction or New Deal policies, reveals a new wealth of detail,
confirming his bold claim that the parties to these conflicts thought and
spoke in self-conscious and sophisticated constitutional terms as they fought
over the rules of engagement and the processes of change and resistance to
change.
How, then, does Ackerman's account of these three moments fare in the
historians' estimation? There are, as I have noted, fascinating disputes over
the meaning and significance of particular texts and events."8 But is
Ackerman right that the historians' criticisms "do not affect [his] central
17. Bruce Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFEcTION: THEORY AND
PRAcTICE OF CONSTITTIONAL AMENDMENT 63, 76-79 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
18. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 YALE L.J. 2279, 2295 n.22
(1999); Rakove, supra, note 8, at 1937-46, 1953-25 (debating the extent of the Founding's
"illegality," and Madison's views on the appropriate role of popular participation in constitutional
change).
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arguments?" 19 First, we should be clear that the historians simply do not
address whether Ackerman's common law of higher lawmaking is a
serviceable tool for courts to determine the bona fides of alleged non-Article
V amendments, nor what kind of guidance, if any, courts, lawmakers, or
citizens, finding themselves in the thick of constitutional, politics, can derive
from these ex post rules of recognition. They ask whether Ackerman's
narrative and the patterns he highlights capture the "actualities" of
constitutional change. Here, Ackerman is right that the historians' criticisms
leave most of his descriptive account of the three moments standing--an d
many facets of it rightly earn their admiration. Ackerman is right too that a
good deal of criticism points toward "gaps," 20 but to my mind not all these
"gaps" are empirical holes that can simply be filled without affecting the
contours and premises of the project.
Some recurrent criticisms run deeper. There are shared misgivings about
the triumphalist, Whiggish arc of Ackerman's moments. He neglects the
contradictory character of his three moments-how profoundly each of them
was shaped by its antagonists as well as its proponents, and how much of
old-and less democratic-eonstitutional orders persisted in and prevailed
over new ones. Ackerman also ignores the possibility of great constitutional
changes that have followed neither Article V nor his legitimating model of
higher-lawmaking. Foner and Burnham both highlight how the institutional
and constitutional order of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
republic was twice transformed, first by Reconstruction and, then again, in
the 1890s, by Reconstruction's foes and the larger "system of 1896," which
legitimated Jim Crow and wove segregation and mass disenfranchisement
into the constitutional fabric of the middle republic. Foner suggests that this
darkfin-de-sikcle moment of change received a kind of popular validation;"
Burnham implies that some of its central elements were imposed largely
through force and fraud.22 Either way, this dark moment must change
Ackerman's Whiggish narrative and the meanings and method it imparts to
the present.
19. Ackerman, supra note 18, at 114.
20. Id.
21. See Eric Foner, The Strange Career of the Reconstruction Amendments, 108 YALE L.J.
2003, 2007-09 (1999).
22. See Walter Dean Burnham, Constitutional Moments and Punctuated Equilibria: A
Political Scientist Confronts Bruce Ackernan's We the People, 108 YALE. L.J. 101, 2265 (1999).
Burnham also points out the national institution "that led the way" for the "forces demanding
change" during this "counter-revolutionary" moment was none other than the Supreme Court-a
"pro-active" role for the judiciary that does not fit within Ackerman's scheme. Id. at 2269. Some
have argued that the "activist" character of the 1890s-1900s Fuller Court provided a kind of
institutional precedent for the Warren Court. Burnham does not take up this comparison, but he
does ask whether the Warren Court's constitutional creativity "ever engaged any part of
Ackerman's model." By Burnham's lights, the Warren "Court's higher lawmaking in and even




The historians' insights complicate Ackerman's storyline in another
way, by suggesting that U.S. history has been punctuated by many more
moments of constitutive change than three. The Jeffersonian and Jacksonian
elections and Presidencies, the rise of American imperialism at the turn of
the twentieth century, the Progressive era, and even the civil rights
movement of mid-century all emerge from these pages as candidates.
Ackerman's own most recent writing notes that movements for fundamental
reform-attended by popular mobilization around constitutive issues of
national identity, popular sovereignty, and the powers and duties of
government-brought forth new parties, pivotal elections, major
institutional changes and doctrinal innovations in each generation of the
nineteenth century.'s Thus Ackerman now seems to agree that even if his
original three moments involved more sweeping changes, the differences
between them and these others are not so great as to warrant the simple
division of American historical time into three long periods of "normal
politics" and three bursts of "constitutional politics" and "higher
lawmaking." Taken together, these revisions imply a somewhat different
narrative of constitutional development-more constantly changing, more
tenaciously remaining the same, involving force-and-fraud-ridden changes
as well as more or less democratic ones, and arrayed into many overlapping
periods of ordinary and constitutional politics and lawmaking.
A final recurrent criticism runs to process and substance. How far can
Ackerman bracket the substance of constitutional change and still render a
persuasive account of the legitimating process? Smith and Foner both insist
that one cannot understand the legitimation of Reconstruction apart from its
moral and political content.24 Burnham and Les Benedict suggest a contrary
possibility: that the popular will of white voters who endorsed the
Fourteenth Amendment was overwhelmingly about punishing the South and
not, as Ackerman claims, about forging a new non-racial understanding of
national citizenship.'
Ackerman asserts rather than demonstrates an equivalence between the
outlooks of reform elites and those of popular movements. The latter are the
seedbed of new constitutional visions in Ackerman's theory, yet we never
glimpse them or their visions in his narratives. To put it harshly, for
Ackerman, the popular will was whatever elites said it was,26 and this
23. See Bruce Ackerman, The Broken Engine of Progressive Politics, AM. PROSPECT, May-
June 1998.
24. See Rogers Smith, Legitimating Reconstruction: The Limits of Legalism, 108 YALE L.J.
2039, 2043(1999); Foner, supra note 21, at 2006-07
25. See Burnham, supra note 22, at 2269-67; Michael Les Benedict, Constitutional History
and Constitutional Theory: Reflections on Ackerman, Reconstruction, and the Transformation of
the American Constitution, 108 YALE L.J. 2237, 2253 (1999).
26. Thus, in his most recent exposition, Ackerman writes that FDR spoke "directly for the
leading movements of his time: the farmers, industrial workers, and liberal intelligentsia and
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equation helps underpin the claim that popular deliberation and
decisionmaking are the heart of the Ackermanian higher-lawmaking
process. In a given "moment," the equation may be true, but it cannot be
assumed. The election returns are no substitute for examining how popular
ideas and aspirations are tallied and translated or suppressed and erased in
relations among social movements, political parties, lawmakers, and
Presidents.
Could a narrative of constitutional moments absorb these criticisms?
Would a more deeply historical account forsake Ackerman's hermeneutical
enterprise--earrying on a conversation between generations about the
contemporary constitutional meaning of past acts and commitments? Would
it leave intact his claim to a purely process-based theory of legitimation?27
Ackerman, as the historians suggest, ignores how deeply the outcome of
Reconstruction was shaped by Reconstruction's foes. Two waves of terror
and disenfranchisement tell the familiar story. First the Southern Redeemers
negotiated a modus vivendi with Northern business elites and their
representatives in the Republican party, while at the same time, they
smashed the Southern Republican party and state governments. Then at
century's end, a second reign of terror and disenfranchising measures
blotted out the remnants of Populism and secured a closed one-party
system.' This New South and its racial apartheid won a special
constitutional status, becoming a distinct society within the Union's new
constitutional order.29  Republicans as well as Democrats, courts,
Congresses, and Presidents alike in large measure condoned this regime and
participated in the weaving of Jim Crow, lynch law, and mass
disenfranchisement into the constitutional fabric of the "middle republic." 
30
The courts' bad faith-shared by the other branches-led to a fatal anomaly
in the constitutional revolution of the New Deal-era, a reactionary core at
the heart of New Deal liberalism.
professions." Bruce Ackerman, The Broken Engine of Progressive Politics, THE AM. PROSPEcT,
May-June 1998, at 34-40.
27. What follows draws on William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98
MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 1999). Since Ackerman and others discuss that work, portions of
which I presented at the Symposium on September 25, 1998, it seems useful very briefly to distill
those parts here.
28. See DEWEY W. GRANTHAM, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE SOLID SOUTH: A PoLIcAL
HISTORY 26 (1988); see also J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS:
SUFFRAGE RESTRICTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH 1880-1910
(1974) (describing the origins of the "solid South" and its one-party political system).
29. However, as Dean Burnham and others have suggested, Southern disenfranchisement bore
a close resemblance to the "Progressive" measures that disenfranchised masses of mostly new
immigrant urban workers in the North. See BURNHAM, supra note 4, at 78.
30. See, e.g., Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). A classic account of the Court's role is found in
C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CRow 70-72 (2d ed. 1966).
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The reactionary core was the Solid South, and its role in the New Deal
points to a problem in Ackerman's account of that "moment." Ackerman
defines constitutional moments as occasions for revising fundamental
commitments and redefining the rights of citizenship.31 How, then, did the
New Deal moment redefine national citizenship? The New Deal, Ackerman
writes, legitimated the national welfare state, but did it enact a non-Article V
amendment guaranteeing a right to welfare? The Court may not be
interested, but the conscientious legislator and citizen might like to know.32
Ackerman dodges the question. Nowhere in his detailed account of the
constitutional politics of the New Deal moment does he explain how, if at
all, citizenship rights were revised.
Precedent, we have seen, is Ackerman's method. To understand the
New Deal moment, look to Reconstruction. When the Reconstruction
Republicans enlarged the powers of Congress, they did so in the name of a
new and enlarged conception of national citizenship. Sixty years later, New
Dealers did the same. The constitutional choices they laid out during and
after the 1936 elections were not only about national lawmakers' authority
to regulate the economy. They also involved recognition of new rights and
new rights-bearers. As with Reconstruction, the new, contended-for rights
promised to supplant a body of law and custom that had codified an outcast,
second-class status-in the first case the Black Codes, and in the second, the
caste-ridden common law of employment and the status of millions of
workers as "industrial serfs" or unemployed "outcasts." 33 Seeking a
mandate for a great expansion of national power, it is no wonder New
Dealers tied that expansion to popularly conceived precommitments in the
form of social and economic rights. Yet for all his work with the texts,
Ackerman offers a truncated picture of this phase of "ratification." He
nowhere even mentions the principles or contours of this new conception of
citizenship.
There is a reason for this studied silence, I think, that will return us to
Reconstruction and to Jim Crow. First, however, let me describe the figure
of citizenship that is missing in Ackerman's story but looms large in the
texts he would have us consult. At its center was a right to decent work and
a decent livelihood-a right to social provision and to a measure of
economic independence and democracy. Its proximate sources were the
era's social movements, like the industrial union movement, and the
progressive reformers and policy mavens who formed the left wing of the
New Deal coalition. As FDR and New Dealers in Congress sought to enlist
and harness these movements and reformers, they adopted their rights
31. See 2 ACKEPIAN, supra note 2, at 6-8; Ackerman, supra note 17, at 76.
32. See Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27
STAN. L. REv. 585 (1975).
33. See Forbath, supra note 27.
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rhetoric.' Roosevelt spoke about these new rights and governmental duties
under the rubric of a "general welfare Constitution," but he embraced a
conception of welfare very different from ours. The "general welfare
Constitution," like FDR's later "second Bill of Rights," encompassed
social insurance and social provision broadly conceived, and above all it
enshrined the "paramount right to work," or what New Dealers frequently
called "employment assurance."3
Where did this robust conception of citizenship originate, and how did it
acquire any claim to constitutional moorings? That is a long and intricate
story, which I tell elsewhere.36 Very schematically, what many of its
architects called "social citizenship" emerged from a reform tradition that
melded constitutional and political economic discourse and linked New
Dealers to Progressives, Populists, and Radical Republicans. We have come
to assume that movements like Populism and Progressivism were at one
with Justice Holmes's insistence that constitutional discourse largely ought
to be divorced from political economy. That was not so. Instead, they sought
to replace the courts with elected lawmakers in the role of the nation's
"authoritative" political economists.37 Holmes held that the Constitution
allowed redistributive reforms; they claimed that it required them, or that it
ought to.
The social citizenship tradition provided FDR and the New Dealers not
only with rights rhetorics, but constitutional narratives, modes of
interpretation, and ideas about the allocation of interpretive authority that
supported their constitutional revolution. In his 1934 address to Congress
announcing the formation of the Committee on Economic Security, FDR
lectured the lawmakers and the nation about interpreting today the "old and
sacred possessive" common-law rights of property and labor that the old
Constitution enshrined.3 1 In pre-industrial America, these common-law
rights had rich significance for the average citizen's freedom; now, only the
recognition of new governmental responsibilities and new rights would
enable "a recovery" of the old rights' once robust social meaning. 9 This
marked the first of FDR's increasingly pointed uses of the reformers'
hermeneutics-the argument of changing conditions imperiling old
34. Id. Famously "pragmatic" and frequently cautious in his policy outlook, FDR often
embraced only to abandon many of the specific programs of these movements. He proved constant,




37. JOHN COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 7 (University of Wis. Press 1957)
(1924).
38. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Message to the Congress Reviewing the Objectives and
Accomplishments of the Administration (June 8, 1934), in 3 PUB. PAPERS 291-92.
39. Id. at 292.
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principles and new interpretations, new rights, and new institutional
arrangements restoring them.
By the later New Deal, social rights had found a secure place not only in
reform rhetoric but in the discourse of the legal establishment. Thus, an
American Law Institute drafting committee concluded that "the place of
social and economic rights in any modem "declaration of the rights of man
had already been decided." '0 In particular, no "modem understanding of a
bill of rights" could omit the right to work, and the ALI committee
anticipated Ackerman's idea of "framework statutes" supplementing formal
constitutional provisions in expressing a "modem understanding" of the
Bill of Rights.4'
Some contemporary constitutional liberals like Cass Sunstein
confidently rely on FDR's "second Bill of Rights" to clinch the argument
that the New Deal Constitution enacted a constitutional right to minimum
welfare entitlements.42 By contrast Ackerman, despite his characterization of
constitutional moments as occasions for considered popular judgments on
"the rights of citizens and the permanent interests of the community,"
43
remains silent, as we have seen, and seemingly unsure about how, if at all,
the New Deal Constitution redefined citizenship rights. And his uncertainty
is justified. There is a gulf between the robust, encompassing rights talk of
FDR's 1936 campaign and his "second Bill of Rights" and the far more
partial patchwork of entitlements that comprised the New Deal's actual
institutional legacy, a gap between the "mandate" and the outcome of the
40. John R. Ellingston, The Right To Work in Full Employment Act of 1945: Hearings Before
a Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on Banking & Currency on S. 380,79th Cong. 1248-49 (1945).
41. As FDR sought enactment of expanded social insurance and an unequivocal federal
commitment to full employment, in 1944 the American Law Institute (ALl) appointed a committee
of legal luminaries to draft a "Statement of Essential Human Rights." The staff of the Senate
committee holding hearings on FDR's 1945 "Full Employment Bill" asked the members of the
ALI group to prepare "an analysis of the legal and philosophical considerations that led to the
inclusion of the right to work" in the ALI Statement.
The ALI draftsmen set out to defend social rights "in the light of traditional [legal] habits of
thought." Id. at 1254. To those who insisted on "looking upon rights as negative," the ALI
draftsmen replied with arguments that continue to run through contemporary debates over positive
versus negative rights. They tracked the Realist contention that, "as a theoretical matter," a
recasting of the background rules of property and contract could readily render the positive right to
work into a negative liberty, id.; likewise, they pointed out that several of the rights in the Bill of
Rights "actually require government to take very positive action indeed... [entailing] all the
involved and expensive machinery for the administration of civil and criminal justice.... In terms
of mechanism and trained personnel, a system of social insurance is child's play in comparison
with the system that gives effect to due process of law." Id. at 1255.
To the reproach that the right to work did not lend itself to judicial enforcement, they
responded first that "legal imagination could develop new procedures" and second that, in any
case, judicial administrability was not the right test of a right: "A Bill of Rights is more than a
consolidation of the fractions of freedom already gained.... It is a directive to the whole society
and a guide to legislatures and executives in the framing of laws and regulations that will gradually
make the rights effective." Id. at 1258.
42. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 138-39 (1993).
43. 1 AcKERMAN, supra note 3, at 240,272-74.
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New Deal "moment," for which Ackerman's constitutional narrative
provides no explanation. But an explanation is at hand, if one takes a more
sober and historical look at our constitutional moments and the reversals and
contradictions bound up with them.
Between the New Deal's popular constitutional "mandate" and its
enactment fell the shadow of Jim Crow and the betrayal of Reconstruction.
Bills instituting universal social citizenship enjoyed widespread support
from Northern Democrats and had powerful champions in successive New
Deal administrations and Congresses. They enjoyed broad but bootless
support from disenfranchised Southern blacks and poor whites as well, but
the poll tax, the literacy test, and other measures and forms of intimidation
blocked them from voting. Instead, Southern Dixiecrats held the balance of
power in Congress, and by dint of their numbers, seniority, and control of
key committees, they thwarted these social citizenship measures. Over and
against bills proposing universal coverage and national standards for social
insurance programs, they insisted on decentralized administration and
standard setting and demanded that key bills exclude the main categories of
Southern labor. By allying with Northern Republicans, or by threatening to
do so, the Solid South stripped all the main pieces of New Deal legislation
of any design or provision that threatened the separate Southern labor
market and its distinctive melding of class and caste relations, its racial
segmentation and its low wages.'
By the 1940s, when measures like the Full Employment Bill appeared
on Congress's docket, the Dixiecrats were in open revolt. Allied with
Northern Republicans, they took the lead in defeating or dismantling the
laws, agencies, and innovations that might have sustained the public rhetoric
and generated the new institutional capacities and commitments embodied
in the "all-important right to work," in the "right to useful, remunerative,
regular... employment," 4 and "to education for work, for citizenship,"46
and ample opportunities for "training and retraining."'
By the early 1940s, many New Dealers agreed that the future of New
Deal reform depended on confronting Jim Crow. These years saw an
outpouring of money and organizers by the CIO to produce an extraordinary
44. See Forbath, supra note 27 (manuscript at 97-101).
45. Full Employment Act of 1945: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Banking and Currency on S. 380,79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 6 (1945).
46. United States Nat'l Resources Planning Bd., National Resources Development Report for
1943,78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943 Doc. No. 128, Part 1, Post War Plan and Program 3 (1943).
47. United States Nat'l Resources Planning Bd., Security, Work, and Relief Policies, Report of
the Committee on Long-Range Work and Relief Policies 508. On the Dixiecrats' role in these
defeats and dismantlings, see STEPHEN KEMP BAILEY, CONGRESS MAKES A LAW: THE STORY
BEHIND THE EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1946 (1950); MARION CLAWSON, NEW DEAL PLANNING: THE
NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD 283-321 (1981); PHILLIP HARVEY, SECURING THE
RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND THE UNEMPLOYED IN THE UNITED
STATES (1989); and MARGARET WEIR, POLITCS AND JOBS 132-79 (1992).
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voter registration drive in the South. In a few Southern states like Alabama
and Georgia, the number of black and poor white voters increased several-
fold. At a rally in Birmingham, one black leader recalled, "those 'first bright
days of Reconstruction [when] the legislatures controlled by the newly freed
slaves and the emancipated poor whites gave to our region its first
democratic governments.' It was time, he said, for 'history to repeat
itself.""'4 But that was not to be, not in time to complete the New Deal's
unfinished reforms or enact the "Second Bill of Rights." The fraud,
intimidation and violence that greeted the fragile Southern movement to
revive the democratic promise of Reconstruction confirmed once more how
such a regional movement ultimately depended on a national commitment to
decisive action based on a broad interpretation of constitutionally protected
civil and political rights. Presented with such a federal commitment in the
late 1930s or early 1940s, perhaps a majority of hard-hit white Southerners
would have proved willing to forsake old political identities rooted in states'
rights and white supremacy, and wager once more on the promised boon of
social citizenship wedded to racial justice. But states' rights and white
supremacy remained too deeply etched in the national government and party
system from which such a commitment would have had to emerge.
White America's and the federal government's abandonment of
Reconstruction did more than deprive black Americans of civil and political
rights for almost another century. By allowing the emergence and
consolidation of the Solid South, this same constitutional bad faith also
operated in the New Deal-era to prevent all Americans from securing the
boon of social citizenship. Waged to secure those social and economic
rights, the New Deal constitutional revolution was left incomplete because
of white America's betrayal of an earlier revolution and its promise of equal
citizenship for blacks 49
From the perspective of this history, the New Deal constitutional legacy
that is under attack today-the "transformative opinions" or amendment-
analogues Ackerman seeks to defend from an unwarranted demise-is a
marred one. We have enshrined the vast expansion of national governmental
power, but not the purpose for which it was expanded. This suggests why
Ackerman's theory might explain how constitutional politics authorized the
New Deal Justices to hand down their transformative opinions, but it cannot
48. PATRICIA SULLIVAN, DAYS OF HOPE: RACE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE NEW DEAL ERA
191 (1996).
49. Broad social and economics rights-talk fell into disuse after the decisive defeats the New
Deal agenda suffered in the 1940s. Blocked by the Dixiecrats at every legislative crossroad, the
CIO, social citizenship's only powerful, organized constituency, gradually abandoned its efforts to
complete the New Deal. By the mid-1950s the industrial unions had begun instead to fashion with
employers a private system of social provision and job security through collective bargaining in
core sectors of the economy. During the same moment, the rigid consensus politics of the Cold
War eclipsed the confident liberalism of New Deal America.
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readily show how the "rights of citizens" were transformed by the New
Deal moment. Matters would be different if the only fault line were the
exclusion of blacks from a newly-enacted national commitment to social
citizenship. But as we have seen, the betrayal of Reconstruction had more
pervasive consequences. It subverted white America's capacity to enact
even a racially exclusionary form of social citizenship. Accordingly, there is
no "synthesis" of racial equality and social rights to be drawn here; the fault
lines are too many.
Thus, Ackerman points to "the Full Employment Act" of 1946 as a
"framework statute" that was "part of the New Deal Constitution" "We the
People" had forged.5' But as we have seen, "We" hollowed out the
constitutional substance of that statute. What possible precommitment could
one draw from the 1946 Act to constrain the "ordinary politics" of today?
In general, the commitments "We" made to ourselves in the New Deal
moment were too deeply compromised by past and present inconstancies to
undergird the kind of "preservative" theory Ackerman desires.
That is the conclusion I draw from reknitting these few strands of
Ackerman's narrative in the light of the historians' insights. This narrative
suggests that even constitutional moments of popular deliberation and
decision making may be concluded by force and fraud, or constrained by the
institutional inheritances of prior moments that merit little legitimacy even
by Ackerman's forgiving lights. History pursued in this fashion may yield
an irremediable plurality of past constitutional choices and commitments,
and we must choose which of them bind us. Or we may decide simply that
we are bound to reopen those constitutive questions that were concluded
illegitimately. Ackerman's narrative aims for more robust prescriptions:
rules of recognition that entail no such substantive choices, that identify the
authoritative texts and meanings from past moments. Even were that project
finally plausible, it would assume a reader whose interpretive interests are
all backward-looking and concerned with authoritative guidance and
binding conclusions. Historians ironically may assume a more forward-
looking audience, at least insofar as the latter's tradition-interpreting
interests are concerned. A lay public making present sense of past
constitutional conflicts and commitments seeks insights that bear on the
field of citizenly debate and action. So, historians prize more searching
conversations with the past that offer less determinate and more choice-
laden meanings for the present. That may be all that Ackerman can offer as
well; he has imbued his theoretical narrative too deeply with historical
learning and imagination to offer less. He has earned our gratitude and
admiration.
50. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 107 n*. Ackerman gets the law's actual title wrong; it was
the "Employment Act of 1946," reflecting the removal of the new federal right and the
institutional and policy innovations proposed in the "Full Employment Act of 1945."
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